暫以我個人較關心的隱私權課題稍作切入好了,首先從做點歷史回顧:在2013年第一次國家審查結論性建議的段落 Right to Privacy (Art. 17)

`69. Para. 164 of the Government’s initial report refers to a highly restrictive policy relating to HIV-positive aliens, including mandatory HIV testing and the requirement of all HIV-positive aliens, including spouses of nationals of Taiwan, to leave the country. The Report concludes that to “catch up with future trends in favor of the international human rights of people who are HIV-positive, the removal of entry restrictions for people who are HIV-positive and not nationals of the Republic of China will be discussed”. The Experts confirm that these restrictive policies are in clear contradiction to the approaches endorsed by WHO and UNAIDS and constitute violations of various human rights, in particular the rights to privacy, freedom of movement, equality and non-discrimination provided for in Articles 2, 12, 17 and 26 ICCPR. The Experts, therefore, recommend abolition of the mandatory HIV testing requirement and lifting of the respective restrictions on the entry, stay and residence of aliens living with HIV.

`70. Article 17 ICCPR prohibits arbitrary interference with an individual’s privacy. As the regulation of sexual behaviour resulting in penal actions would constitute an arbitrary interference with privacy, unless when absolutely necessary for the protection of those affected or where it is carried out through force, the Experts are of the opinion that criminalising adultery is not in conformity with Article 17 ICCPR. The Experts recommend that the Government should take steps to abolish this provision from the Criminal Code.

`71. The statistics on communication monitoring are high enough to raise concerns about the potential for misuse by interfering with the right to privacy. 17,548 cases were received by the Telecommunication Surveillance Centre of the National Police Agency in 2012. While some requests for surveillance were rejected, the vast number was approved, probably for legitimate reasons. The Experts found no particular problem with the process as described by the Government. While the Experts did not receive any report of misuse, they note that in other countries such systems have often led to abuse, and they therefore recommend that a vigorous process of judicial oversight be maintained and wider access be provided for complaints of misuse.


`69. 政府初步報告第164段提到一項對愛滋病毒感染者之外國人非常嚴格的政策,包括強制愛滋病毒篩檢,及要求所有愛滋病毒感染者的外國人,包括中華民國(臺灣)人的配偶應離境。該報告結論認為「未來配合愛滋病毒感染者之國際人權潮流,將研議刪除限制非本國籍愛滋病毒感染者入境之規定」。專家確認,這些限制性政策明顯牴觸世界衛生組織和聯合國愛滋病規劃署認可的方法,並構成對多種人權的侵犯,特別是《公民與政治權利國際公約》第2、12、17和26條所規定的隱私權、遷徙自由、平等及零歧視。因此,專家建議廢除強制愛滋病毒篩檢的要求,解除感染愛滋病毒外國人士入境、停留和居住的各種限制。

`70. 《公民與政治權利國際公約》第17條款禁止對個人私生活的無理侵擾。由於以刑事手段管制性行為會構成對私生活的無理侵擾,除非是受影響的人需要保護或是以強迫手段為之而有絕對的必要,專家認為通姦罪不符合《公民與政治權利國際公約》第17條。專家建議政府應採取措施從刑法中廢除這項規定。

`71. 通訊監察的統計數據高到令人擔心濫用的可能性而侵擾隱私權。警政署通訊監察中心在2012年共收到17,548個案件。雖然有些通訊監察的聲請被駁回,但在可能有正當理由的情況下,大部份的聲請還是被核准。專家對於政府描述的程序沒有發現特別的問題。雖然專家沒有收到任何濫用的報告,但專家指出這樣的制度在其他國家往往會遭到濫用,因此,專家建議政府維持一個有力的司法監督程序且提供更廣泛的管道來受理濫用的申訴。


然後四年後,第二次國家審查問題清單對於公政公約第十七條隱私權的相關提問如下: ARTICLE 17

`49. In the previous Concluding Observations, the Experts recommended that the Government should take steps to abolish provisions in the Criminal Code that criminalises adultery as this would constitute an arbitrary interference with privacy. Please provide information on whether this has been done or whether there is an intention to do so.

`50. The Report also indicates that any illegal surveillance with regard to communication monitoring would be subject to civil and criminal liabilities (§ 271). Please provide information of cases where legal action has been taken against illegal surveillance, if any.

NGOs, 人權倡議者是否想透過國際審查最終提出的結論建議,作為某種要求政府或台灣做為一個國家整體上下追求的目標?好啦,這樣說未免陳義過高,放簡單一點來講,有什麼是NGOs,人權倡議者該追著打的議題,又剛好可以趁此機會(結論性建議)來擬出要求政府逐步要實現的短中長程目標?

例如隱私權的問題,國際間熱門關注焦點是什麼?(例如商業私人公司大規模個資收集、數位巨型監控、大型資料庫問題)其恆久爭辯的糾纏又是什麼(個人與集體權利之間的衡平、國家安全與個別侵害….)?而台灣面臨隱私權的挑戰,有不同於其它國家嗎?如果台灣與外國之間數位時代下的隱私保護挑戰差異不大,那麼為什麼在此議題在人權報告審查上卻沒有打中核心地被突顯出來,反而只是被問了二題不痛不癢讓政府部門可以輕騎過關的問題? 看到議題清單中所指出的這兩個問題,我個人是覺得寄望明年的審查為台灣數位監控與個資收集等隱私挑戰提出人權保議框架建議的機會應該是注定落空了。

不過話說回來,如果某項人權運動真有清楚的目標,那麼聯合國人權機制的管道和場域也不過是其中一個利用出口轉內銷的手段作法,但台灣不是個被承認的國家,想要透過這種正式國際場合naming and shaming本來難度就非常高,本益比實在太不合算。我的意思是,要達到目標有許多路徑和方法,草根培力、法律訴訟、國會監督等等—-如果知道(或是有想像過)目的地在哪裏。

最後,找出了2014年3月對美國公政公約報告審查後所作出的結論建議部份摘錄: CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 National Security Agency surveillance

The Committee is concerned about the surveillance of communications in the interest of protecting national security, conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) both within and outside the United States, through the bulk phone metadata surveillance programme (Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act) and, in particular, surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendment Act, conducted through PRISM (collection ofcommunications content from United States-based Internet companies) and UPSTREAM (collection of communications metadata and content by tapping fiber-optic cables carrying Internet traffic) and the adverse impact on individuals’ right to privacy. The Committee is concerned that, until recently, judicial interpretations of FISA and rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) had largely been kept secret, thus not allowing affected persons to know the law with sufficient precision. The Committee is concerned that the current oversight system of the activities of the NSA fails to effectively protect the rights of the persons affected. While welcoming the recent Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, which now extends some safeguards to non-United States citizens “to the maximum extent feasible consistent with the national security”, the Committee remains concerned that such persons enjoy only limited protection against excessive surveillance. Finally, the Committee is concerned that the persons affected have no access to effective remedies in case of abuse (arts. 2, 5 (1) and 17).

The State party should:

a. Take all necessary measures to ensure that its surveillance activities, both within and outside the United States, conform to its obligations under the Covenant, including article 17 ; in particular, measures should be taken to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity , regardless of the nationality or location of the individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance;

b. Ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence is authorized by laws that : ( i ) are publicly accessible; (ii) contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access to and use of communication s data are tailored to specific legitimate aims; (iii) are sufficiently precise and specify in detail the precise circumstances in which any such interference may be permitted , the procedures for authoriz ation , the categories of persons who may be placed under surveillance , the limit on the duration of surveillance; procedures for the use and storage of data collected; and (i v ) provide for effective safeguards against abuse ;

c. Reform the current oversight system of surveillance activities to ensure its effectiveness , including by providing for judicial involvement in the authorization or monitoring of surveillance measures, and considering the establish ment of strong and independent oversight mandates with a view to prevent ing abuses;

d. Refrain from imposing mandatory retention of data by third parties;

e. Ensure that affected persons have access to effective remedies in cases of abuse.